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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

state law actually conflicted with federal law to the extent it stood as an
The court found neither of these
obstacle to Congress' objectives.
situations existed here. Thus, the court found no basis for refusing to
enforce New York's Labor Law in this case.
The court found that protecting workers employed in New York fell
within the state's historic police powers. Furthermore, the court noted that
the LHWCA only regulated the relationship between longshoremen/harbor
workers, their employers, and vessel owners. Congress did not regulate
rights or remedies outside of those relationships. Therefore, since the
LHWCA did not address claims by injured workers against third parties,
the court found no indication Congress intended to preclude application of
New York law to third-party claims against non-maritime defendants. In
addition, the court found no inconsistencies between the strict liability
provisions of the New York Labor Law and admiralty law. Therefore, the
strict liability provisions of the New York Labor Law were not preempted,
and the court reversed the order granting defendant's motion to dismiss.
Ryan 0. Reimers
In re Moores Lane Dev. Corp. v. Suffolk County Water Auth., 699
N.Y.S.2d 739 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (holding that the county water
authority assumed the contractual obligation to provide water service to
developer when the authority purchased the water distribution system from
the village).
Pursuant to a contract, the Village of Greenport ("Village") agreed to
provide water to ninety-nine condominium units that petitioner's
In exchange for this service, the
predecessor intended to build.
predecessor agreed to pay $2570 per unit and any increases in hookup
charges that the Village imposed in future years. After the predecessor
built thirty-nine units, he sold the remaining property and assigned the
water contract to the petitioner, Moores Lane Development Corporation
("Moores Lane"). In 1994, the Village consented to the assignment and
demanded an additional $2162 per unit and a water up-front fee for the
remaining sixty units. The Village provided water to nineteen units as
Moores Lane built them. Subsequently, the Suffolk County Water
Authority ("SCWA") purchased the water distribution system outside the
Village boundaries. At that time, the Village and the SCWA denied
responsibility for supplying water to the remaining forty-one units.
Moores Lane commenced an action to compel either the Village or the
SCWA or both to supply water service. The Supreme Court of Suffolk
County directed the SCWA to supply water to Moores Lane's subdivision
and directed the Village to refund the sum of $88,642. The court also
directed Moores Lane to pay additional water hookup fees to the SCWA.
The issue on appeal was whether the SCWA assumed the obligation to
Moores Lane when it purchased the water distribution system from the
Village.
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This court found that the interpretation of an unambiguous contract was
a function of the court. The court stated that it would not consider
extrinsic matters when the instrument showed the intent of the parties. The
court held that the contract between the Village and the SCWA clearly
provided that the SCWA would assume operation and responsibility for the
water supply and distribution system outside of the Village.
The court held that the SCWA assumed the contractual obligation to
provide water service to Moores Lane. In addition, the court found that
the lower court erred in its determination of the amount of the refund to
Moores Lane. The court directed the Village to refund a new amount of
$194,012, which represented the $2,570 per-unit connection fees that the
predecessor previously paid. Therefore, the court affirmed and modified
the lower court's decision.
Kristen L. Cassisa
In re Warrensburg Hydro Power Ltd. Partnership, 694 N.Y.S.2d 506
(N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (holding that the deed conveying water power
rights appurtenant to property on north bank to the owner of the parcel
located across the river, together with certified title abstract, supported a
determination that owner of north bank parcel was not entitled to any
compensation for water power rights).
Petitioner obtained title to less than one acre of land located on the
north bank of Schroon River in the Town of Warrensburg, pursuant to a
1992 eminent domain proceeding brought against claimant, the owner of
the land. The parcel was appropriated for construction, maintenance, and
operation of a hydroelectric facility. The eminent domain order, vesting
title in petitioner, reserved to claimant continued use of the land for
transmission poles and lines. Claimant filed a claim for $270,000 seeking
just compensation for the taking of water power rights purportedly
associated with the land acquired by petitioner on which claimant's
transmission lines were situated. The court denied claimant's motion and
granted partial summary judgment for petitioner and claimant appealed.
On appeal, the issue was whether the water power rights were
appurtenant to the north side property or if the water rights belonged to the
land across the river. In addressing this issue, the court traced the chain of
title pertaining to the adverse interests. It found that in the 1800's, the
water power rights were severed from the north side property and
conveyed to the land across the river. Claimant contended the water power
rights were restored to the north side property, but could not produce
substantiating evidence. A title search concluded no documentation existed
revealing claimant, or its predecessors, were granted water power rights.
Claimant also contended that Maurice Ashe, a prior owner, obtained
the exclusive right to construct a dam on the river with certain water rights
through a deed dated June 21, 1930. However, the court concluded that
the June 1930 deed reserved an easement authorizing the grantor to
maintain and operate the present dam and to continue the upstream flooding

